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AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW.'
The theme for discussion is not free from complexities. Consequently within the limits prescribed I shall attempt to consider it
only in a large or most general way.
It may be well at the outset, in view of the different meanings
of the term "publio law," to explain the sense in which it is to be
taken in this paper. The modem and conventional definition of
public law is that part of the positive law of a given state which relates solely to the State and to the public order of government.
"Publicum jus est quod ad statum rei publicae" (I. 1, 14). The
division of law into public law and private law is as old as Aristotle
(Rhet. 1, 13, 3). In principle this division was entirely familiar to
Roman lawyers, and it has been retained in every modem system.
Hale and Blackstone substantially adopted the division of law into
public law and private law, and thus lent to it the sanction of their
great names, although the analytical jurists of England, such as
Austin and Amos, criticise it with severity as a cross-division.
Scientifically there is in their criticism a basis of truth. There are
numerous rules or principles which may just as well be included
in private law as in public law. But nevertheless, the dichotomy of
law into public law and private law is an instance when scientific
accuracy may well give way to the general convenience. Nothing
more comprehensive than a division of law into public law and
private law has ever been suggested by jurisits of any school.
In the Roman and the modem sense, "public law" includes (1)
constitutional law: (2) Jus sacrum, or the law relating to the state
church and religion; (3) criminal law, and (4) the law which
Kant, in company with many jurists less philosophical, terms the
law of nations. It is in view of the fact that the surface of the
earth is not unlimited, but circumscribed into a unity, that Kant
includes in the public law of a State the law of nations. Had the
'The substance of this paper was contained in an address delivered
before the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress at Washington, D. C.,
January 3, 1916, by the writer.
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area of the earth's surface been unlimited the law of nations
would have had a different content and application. In this comprehensive outline of public law it will be observed that "constitutional law" comprises all the laws which determine in whom the
sovereign power of a state resides, how that power shall be exercised, and the limitations imposed on all officers and agents of
government; in short, all administrative law, or, in other words, all
that law which according to Domat relates to public order.
When we compare American public law with the public law of
the Roman lawyers and their congeners, the civilians, we should
not omit to notice a distinction: the public law of the Corpus Juris
was something distinctively Roman and even Byzantine. It is well
said that no modem state has ever adopted the public law of the
Romans. It was the private law of Rome which evinced the best
juristic qualities of the Italian people. The more familiar part of
the Corpus Juris and of the Institutes of Gaius and of Justinian
consisted almost exclusively of private law. The Codex was concerned to a much greater extent than the digest with public law.
Indeed it was the Codex which was specially reserved for the public
law of the Romans. In the United States public law is largely contained in the constitutions of government, State and Federal, and
in the statutes of the several organisms within the Federal state.
When contrasted with public law, it is evident that private law
is concerned with the self-interest of the individual, while public
law has reference to the common interests of the public qua public.
Obviously "private law," as Lord Bacon well said, always lies
under the protection of public law: "lus privatum sub tutela juris
publici latet" (Works 1, p. 804). Public law is referred to at times
as the paramount law of a Federal State because private law is in
a greater or lesser degree dependent on public law. It is curious
to observe that in modern times our political society may be said
to be engaged in a ceaseless endeavor to make private law encroach on the domain of public law. The processes of this encroachment represent in fact our modern politics.
Very cursorily I have, as I hope, now indicated with tolerable
precision the sense in which I shall employ the term "public law."
It will be immediately apparent that, as in this country we have
no State church, we can very well afford at this time to ignore
that department of public law which is concerned with religion, although it is highly probable that at no distant day this recognized
department of public law may present even in this country some
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very interesting questions for public discussion. The subdivision,
criminal law, may also be ignored at this time, although its consideration could be led to embrace crimes committed by civil persons, otherwise called corporations; a subject, I think, very far
from exhausted by American legislators and American lawyers.
This elimination will leave for our present consideration constitutional law and, incidentally, the law of nations. I have already indicated that in its widest sense constitutional law comprises all the
sovereign powers of a State, so that we may legitimately confine
the few and desultory observations which I shall present to you to
two subjects of never-failing interest. I refer to American
sovereignty in its inward and in its outward manifestations.
Before venturing on the general discussion of the sovereignty
of the Federal Government of this country, it may be well to recall
that the sovereign powers of all governments are distributed among
three great departments--executive, legislative and judicial. This
distribution is, in the instancd of our Federal Government, so emphasized as to engender a discussion among political thinkers concerning the prototype of the judicial department of the Government of the United States. Had it any prototype? A correct
answer to this question is not perhaps so difficult as it at first seems.
The Constitution of this Government was the empirical product of
the traditions, customs and aspirations of the English-speaking
people who founded the United States. The Federal Constitution
of 1787 was not the miracle often depicted; it was an orderly sequence from anterior facts and the logical resultant of hard experience, not of political theory. As Lord Bryce has well said, it
was not an a priori construction.
The origins of the framework of our present government can
readily be detected in the earlier institutions and customs of the
seaboard colonies of North America. Providentially it was a
singularly sober, thoughtful and political minded people who first
came to these shores, and to .them and their direct descendants,
now comprising at least fifty millions, or more than one-half of
our present population, the existence and even the persistence of
our present political institutions are primarily due.
At the outbreak of the War of Independence practically all of
the three millions of people, then inhabiting the Atlantic seaboard
of North America, were, as Franklin said, the descendants of
English-speaking men who had migrated to America in the course
of the seventeenth century, or prior to 1700. In the eighteenth cen-
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tury immigation was comparatively light. Thus it was that in the
year 1776 few of the inhabitants of the thirteen colonies had ever
been out of North America. They were already of the soil, and already stout upholders of a very definite political creed. For a
century past there had been close and constant discussion among
the colonists concerning the theory and the framework of the
colonial government. In this discussion the abstract political rights
of the inhabitants of the American colonies were not ignored. In
consequence, when the Revolutionary War broke out, in April,
1775, there was here a trained citizenship such as the modern
world, prior to that time, had never seen.
I have already mentioned that the constitutional law of a State
or nation comprises all those laws which determine in whom the
sovereign power of the nation or State resides. In a federal state
there is not only an organized nation, but at the same time the peoples of the particular states also possess organic unity. In its particular sphere each government is absolute and supreme. The
composite character of a Federal State has given rise to much discussion concerning the seat of sovereignty in the United States. It
is not necessary for us to consider the controversial elements of this
discussion at this time. They are familiar to all publicists as well
as to some practical politicians. But it is premature to discuss the
nature of sovereignty in a given state until we have assigned the
state itself to its proper place in some general classification of governments. The United States is what is known as a federal state.
To give with philosophical precision a real definition of a federal
state would be a labor of magnitude. There are shades of differences between all the types of federated states known to history.
But there is at the same time between all these types a certain agreement in particulars which determine whether a state is or is not
a federal state.
A federal state is sovereign in its own sphere, be it large or narrow, just as the federated states related to it are sovereign in their
individual spheres. The distinction between "Staatenbund," bandless or confederated states, and "Bundestaat," or a banded state,
is entirely familiar. A federal government within its own prescribed range of action is carried on as freely as if there were no
such thing as a separate state -(Freeman, Federal Government in
Greece and Italy, 11). Let no sensible man at this late day in
the United States question that whatever powers are not vested in
the federal government belong to the several states or to the citizens
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of those states as a body politic (George Ticknor Curtis, "Implied
Powers of the Constitution," 7). The bond which unites a federal
government to the governments of the banded states may, however,
be expressed in a great variety of ways. Nothing can be more
elastic than the terms upon which a federal state becomes an independent political entity and assumes the hegemony of its constituent
states. The powers entrusted to the Federal State may be very
great or they may be very limited, always provided that within its
own sphere of action the federal state is left independent and to
that extent distinctly sovereign. While a federal Itate is ordinarily
paramount only within the sphere of its own action, there is some
inherent evidence that the government of the United States was intended to have a supervising power of a kind not ordinarily entrusted to a federal state. The Federal Constitution of 1787 is in
one notable particular of general operation within the federated
states, and this particular is quite outside of the federal sphere of
action. The federal Constitution prohibits the legislatures of the
states from passing any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts. This limitation on the legislative power of the States of the Union has only a very indirect relation to the sovereignty of the federal government. It has, however, a distinct relation to the general supremacy of the federal
state.
What is meant by the sovereignty of a State is all the powers
of that State when it is considered in its highest dignity and greatest
force. The United States of America is conceded by publicists to
be the most carefully elaborated specimen of a federal state known
to history. Indeed it is the legal terminology of the United States
which has developed most clearly the difference between a federation and a confederation of states. The public law of the United
States is in some respects a distinctly modern manifestation. It
has at its base a new or modern conception of the inherent rights
of the individual citizen. About this there is nothing medieval or
classical. I venture to think that the public law of the German
federation is not nearly so well worked out in detail as is the public
law of the United States of America. The fundamental rights of
the individual German subject are left obscure in comparison with
our clearer enunciation of the fundamental rights of the citizens
of the United States. This is not to conclude that the Federation
of German States is inartificial. In some few respects the legislative chambers of the great Federal State, called the German Em-
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pire, are better constituted than are our own Senate and House of
Representatives. Their temporary committees, for instance, are
better working bodies than our permanent committees with their
extended powers. Nevertheless it is certain that in the history of
no other nation besides that of the United States have the limitations upon the powers of the component states and those of the
federal state been specified with such philosophic precision and
such exact balance. This is not strange if we consider that the
germs of 'federation were in America, as in Greece, from the first
in the air. We detect them in a rudimentary form in the substantial
federation of the New England towns. Some of the original
colonies were at first distinctly federations of village communities.
For a considerable period after the North American Federal
Union was completed in 1787 the great political question in this
country was: Where does sovereignty reside? To determine this
question and negative the claim of a constituent state's right to
secede from the Union a long and fratricidal war was deemed
necessary by the dissident states, notwithstanding that historical
data anterior to the Federal Constitution of 1787 had definitively
answered the question. The federal state existed prior to the Constitution of 1787. It is, to my mind, a very grave error to conceive
that constitutions ever create sovereignty. Sovereignty is an organic force. It is sovereignty which creates constitutions and not
constitutions which create sovereignty. The Government of the
United States was distinctly federal and sovereign before a line of
the Constitution of the United States was promulgated. In this
particular the constitution was declarative. Political powers are
not created artificially uno ictu. They pre-exist, at least in posse
or in intention, before their written declarations are formulated.
Let me explain more in detail what I mean.
The original people of the thirteen states forming the Federal
Union were a homogeneous people, in political subordination to a
great European state. When a homogeneous people, inhabiting contiguous political dependencies of the same empire, subverted the
imperial government, necessarily the powers of the old government
immediately accrued, partly to the whole people of all the colonies
as an indivisible body and partly to the separate peoples inhabiting
a particular colony. Upon examination it will be found that the
imperial powers, known as the prerogatives of the crown, as they
thitherto affected all the people in all the colonies without regard
to demarcations of territory, accrued to the whole people of all the
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colonies as joint actors in the Revolution; while those powers of
the subverted colonial governments which did not concern the
whole people alone accrued to those whom they did concern, to
wit, the people in a particular colony. The moment the Declaration
of Independence and the overt military resistance to the rule of the
mother land took place, any general governmental authority over
the North Atlantic colonies necessarily became unitary and, if
effective, federal. The vice of the Articles of Confederation was
that they failed to partition rightly the subverted powers of the old
government; they did not conform to the fact "fait accompli." A
confederation of States did not, in this instance, truly express the
precise relation of the const'tuent states to the general government.
Within a certain sphere of action the separate states did not' act
conjointly after the year 1776, and consequently the general agent
was within that sphere already a federal state.
But there is other evidence in favor of my statement, that the
government of the United States was federal prior to the Constitution of 1787. The distinctive mark of a federal government is
that the federal state, within its own sphere of action, has all the
marks of an absolutely independent government. In that great
territory, an empire in itself, known as the "North West Territory,"
the government of the United States was in respect of the three
great powers of government, legislative, judicial and executive,
possessed by every autonomous state, supreme and independent of
all outside dictation before the adoption of the Federal Constitution
of 1787. By the ordinances of 1784 and 1787 Congress established
a permanent government and constitution for the North West Territory. Until the states in that territory were organized, the United
States was alone the absolute sovereign within the North West Territory. The States outside of the territory had no share in its government. Consequently the federal government of the United
States existed as an independent state before the ratification of
the Federal Constitution of 1787. In an article printed in the
year 1887 in the American Law Review, I elaborated the theory
just stated. I am very happy to observe that since then, doubtless
quite independently of my investigations, the proper authorities of
Harvard University have arrived at the same conclusion, and
thus the theory I first enunciated is now, in any event, taught or
held in that university.
It can hardly be denied that the Federal State was an autonomous state prior to the federal constitution, if it possessed, as
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already stated, the three great powers, legislative, executive and
judicial, which, in Kantian philosophy, are said to pertain to every
autonomous state. The Constitution of 1787, however, perfected
the autonomy of the Federal Sta.te in such a masterly way that no
other Federal State ever possessed the nice powers of internal government in the same degree as the great federal state, now known
ab extra as the United States of America and ab intra as "the
federal government." The outcome of the work of the Convention
of 1787 was so logical and natural in character that had the Federal
Constitution of 1787 failed of adoption, some other federal organization must have inevitably resulted in a short time. A federal
government was the only possible government in North America
after the definitive peace with England in 1783.
The genesis of political institutions is not always obscure. The
political history of the thirteen original colonies, composing the
United States in the year 1776, demonstrates that the major part
of the framework of the Federal government was laid down long
before the adoption of the Constitution of 1787. For example, the
title of each colony to equal representation in the Federal councils
may be traced back to the year 1643. In 1643 the New England
plantations first confederated for united action. By the terms of
union each colony preserved its jurisdiction and powers of internal
government intact, and without regard to size or population was
represented by the same number of delegates in the Federal councils (1 Palfrey's New England, 445; 1 Pitkiri's U. S., appendix 1,
and pp. 50, 52; 2 Hazard's State Papers Preface and p. 1). In
1754 the plan of the Colonial Convention of that year, although
abortive (it being rejected by both the English and the Americans),
had again a just regard to the decentralized principle of a Federal
republic. In the Continental Congresses of 1774, 1775 and 1776
each colony, without regard to size or population, was given an
equal voice. Thus from the dawn of our colonial history it was
evident that any future general government of the American States
would be based on some principle of equal representation in the
Federal councils. The Constitution of 1787 was only a final restatement of an old principle of union. In that constitution each State,
without regard to size or population, is allotted two senators in
the upper house of the Congress. It is not irrelevant to notice
at this point that the Senate of the United States is invested
with some powers which are very far removed from powers purely
legislative in character. It is not only in the upper legislative chain-
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ber that the federated states have an equal voice, but in certain
executive matters of moment in the processes of a great government.
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was a triumphant success not only because prior to the War of the Revolution the leading
men in the convention had become fairly familiar with the framework of all forms of government, ancient and modern, but because
they had gleaned much of value from a hard and critical experience.
For years past they had then had daily under their eyes the
spectacle of a judiciary which arrogated to itself the abstract power
of determining whether or not the acts of the various colonial legislatures and officers of Government conformed to what were already
termed, not only in state papers, but in public discussion, the constitutions of government. As early as 1761, in the Writ of Assistance
cases, the colonial lawyers went so far as to assert that even the
laws of the Imperial Parliament must conform to constitutional
principles in order to have effective validity. Doubtless this was
only a recrudescence of Coke's doctrine in Dr. Bonham's case,
practically adopted by such great Englishmen as Chief Justice
Hobart (Hobart's Rep., 14), and Lord Mansfield (1 Atk., 33). It
is therefore not extreme to affirm that the right of the American
judiciary to determine the validity, or the constitutionality as it is
termed, of an act of a legislative body long antedated the promulgation of the Federal Constitution in 1787. The famous
American case of Lechmere v. Winthrop, in the year 1727, is alone
sufficient to establish this point.
The Constitutional Convention did not fail to make use of historical precedents. When the present federal constitution was in
course of preparation in the year 1787, there was one historic exemplar which did not lack consideration (Gilpin, 1334; Eliot, 429).
The old kingdom of Aragon possessed a singular institution which
was very fascinating to some of the more thoughtful members of
the convention. I refer to the power of the justiza, the Supreme
Judge of that little kingdom. Robertson, in his admirable "History of the Reign of Charles V." well describes the peculiar powers
of the Justiza of Aragon, and what he said is worth quoting.
He says: "Not satisfied with having erected formidable barriers
against the encroachments of the royal prerogative, nor willing to
commit the sole guardianship of their liberties entirely to the
vigilance and authority of an assembly similar to the diets, statesgeneral and parliaments, in which the other feudal nations have

FORDHAMI

LAW REVIEW

placed so much confidence, the Aragonese had recourse to an institution peculiar to themselves and elected a jystiza, or supreme
judge. This magistrate, whose office bore some resemblance to
that of the ephori in ancient Sparta, acted as the protector of the
people and the controller of the prince. The person of the justiza
was sacred, his power and jurisdiction almost unbounded. He
was the supreme interpreter of the laws. Not only inferior judges,
but kings themselves, were bound to consult him in every doubtful case and to receive his responses with implicit deference. An
appeal lay to him from the .royal judges as well as from those
appointed by the barons within their respective territories. Even
when no appeal to him, he could interpose by his own authority,
prohibit the ordinary judge to proceed, take immediate cognizance
of the cause himself and remove the party accused to the manifestation, or prison of the State, to which no person had access but
by his permission. His power was exerted with no less vigor and
effect in superintending the administration of government than in
regulating the course of justice. It was the prerogative of the
justiza to inspect the conduct of the king.- He had a title to review all the royal proclamations and patents and to declare whether
or not they were agreeable to law and ought to be carried into
execution. He, by his sole authority, could exclude any of the
king's ministers from the conduct of affairs and call them to answer for their maladministration. He himself was accountable to
the Cortes only for the manner in which he discharged the duties
of this high office and performed functions of the greatest importance that could be committed to a subject" (Robertson's History of Charles V, 1, 161).
But there were other and less remote precedents than that of
Aragon more familiar to the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The subordination of the Colonial Legislatures
to the judiciary of the colonies, because of the expressed limitations
upon the powers of the Colonial Legislatures, was a marked feature of all the American Colonial governmlennts subject to the English crown. The history of this judicial supremacy, which was
strenuously insisted on long before the American Revolution by
iuch Colonial lawyers as Otis and John Adams of Massachusetts,
is very ably given by Professor Charles B. Elliott in the Political
Science Quarterly (5 Polit. Science Quar., 224), and by Professor
James Bradley Thayer of Harvard in a paper read before the Congress of Jurisprudence in August, 1893 -(Little, Brown & Co., Bos-
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ton, 1893). In 1895, ignorant of these contributions, I ventured to
publish my own conceptions of the development of the judicial
power in the Federal Constitution (29 Am. Law Review, 711), a
fact I mention merely because the paper contained some references
to authorities of very distinct value. The paper itself was too late
in order of time to possess any valid claim to originality. But it is
unnecessary here to pursue further the history and development of
the judicial power in the Federal Constitution. It is only necessary to notice that since 1893 it is generally conceded that the
Federal judicial establishment of the United States had a prototype.
'The express authority of the Federal judiciary, in the proper
forum, to declare void a legislative act of a state of the Union
when such act conflicts with the organic law, is sometimes thought
to be clearer than its authority to declare void an act of the Federal
Legislature when that legislation conflicts with the constittition of
the Federal state. But both powers ex necessitate rei proceed on
the same general principle and are founded on the same precedents. The exercise of the one power is as essential to the protection of the nation as the exercise of the other is to the protection
of the federated states. The fact that the judicial power of the
Federal establishment is called into play only in the course of litigations sometimes tends to obscure the extraordinary powers vested
in the Supreme Court of the United States by the Federal Constitution.
Doubtless the power of greatest dignity and importance conferred on the Federal judiciary by the Federal Constitution relates
not to their jurisdiction of ordinary litigations, but to their jurisdiction over contentions and controversies between states. It was
intended that the Supreme Court of the United States should be the
permanent arbitrator of all serious differences between the constituent states of the United States, and also the arbitrator of all the
graver controversies between the Federal state and the states of
the Union, if the Federal state so elected. In any plan of Federal
government some mode of arbitrating differences between the combined governments is essential to permanence. The paramountcy
of the terms of union must be safeguarded against all infractions or
invasion, and the only effective protection is afforded by the principle of compulsory arbitration. Among the Grecian Commonwealths, the history of which was imperfectly familiar to the
members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, examples of
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arbitration are very frequent. In ancient Greece the Amphiktyonic
Councils, whatever thei were originally, became in course of time
to some extent councils of arbitration for the contending political
units contained in the federations of Greece. These councils finally
passed on a variety of issues arising between the different Grecian
communities. The decisions of these councils ought in fact to have
furnished a sort of international law of Greece. In America of
the present the most important decrees of the federal judiciary of
this country constitute a kind of international or interstate law for
the States of the Union. The best exercise of this peculiar function of the federal judiciary of this country calls for very statesmanlike qualities in the judges, and it is perhaps not too much to say
that the most distinguished personages in the history of the Supreme
Court of the United States are those who have exhibited these
statesmanlike qualities in the most eminent degree. The Supreme
Court is the one court of America where the narrow learning of
lawyers is of secondary importance to yet higher qualifications. It
is quite unnecessary for present purposes to review the technical
and familiar side of the jurisdiction of the federal courts of this
country. Many principles of profound political and constitutional
importance are laid down almost daily in private litigations or in
suits and controversies between private persons. But here we may
confine our survey to the jurisdiction of the federal tribunals in controversies between the states of the Union or, at the election of the
federal government, in controversies between the great federal
state and the states of the Union. That branch of the jurisdiction
of the federal courts was intended as a formal substitute for a
voluntary system of arbitration. For the purpose intended it is
highly probable that no better machinery could have been devised.
These considerations lead naturally to the conclusions that a
principle of arbitration, the autonomy of the separate political units
composing the federal state, and the perfect political equality of
these entities in the federal councils are leading characteristics of
the public law of the United States. That each and all of -these
characteristics is susceptible of a more extended development and a
larger application than at present there can be little doubt. By
reason of the limited fertile and inhabitable areas of the globus
terraqueous whicl we call the world, men, as Kant said in substance, are placed in such close and thoroughgoing relations of
each to all the rest that intimate intercourse is indispensable to
the development of the common heritage of mankind. Now, this
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intercourse requires general regulation. Such general regulation
can proceed on no better principles than those at least adumbrated in the leading characteristics of the public law of the
United States of America. The public law of the United States is
in part a development of the law ol nations.
It remains to notice that a federal constitution of government
has the force and the quality of durability as well as other great
merits. This the whole history of our government and nation
exemplifies. The federal government of -the United States has
already outlived almost all the national governments of Europe.
It has survived numerous forms of government in France and in
almost all the other countries of Europe. England is not even an
exception, for#the government of the British Isles has undergone
momentous changes of a far-reaching kind since our federal government was formally erected. The English Constitution of to-day
is not that of 1787. During the period of its already long existence
the Government of the United States of America has, as the
philosophic historian Freeman in his most valuable but fragmentary
History of Federal Government 2 states, "actually secured a greater
amount of combined peace and freedom than was ever before enjoyed by so large a portion of the earth's surface."
That a federal government is that form best adapted to national
development, without interference with the rights of the members
adhering to the federation, is illustrated by the rapid expansion of
the possessions of the United States. The cession of the Northwest Territory to the federal government in 1784 was but the beginning of the acquisition by the United States of a new empire,
to become even more distinctly federal possessions than the Northwest Territory had ever been. By the Treaty of Paris, known as
the Treaty of September 3, 1783, the eastern bank of the Mississippi, as far south as the thirty-first parallel, ceded to Great
Britain in 1763, passed under the control of the United States.
On April 30, 1803, France ceded the whole of the Province of
Louisiana, together with all adjacent islands, to the United States.
But by the third article of the Treaty of 1803 the inhabitants of the
ceded territory were to be incorporated in the Union and admitted
as soon as possible thereafter to the enjoyment of all the rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States. This
was a very farsighted provision on the part of France, one designed
'Only the first volume ever appeared.
Greek federations.

This is practically a history of
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for the efficient protection of the inhabitants of the ceded territory.
On February 22, 1819, Spain ceded to the United States all the
Spanish territories east of the Mississippi, known as East and
West Florida, together with the adjacent islands dependent on said
province. In 1845 Texas was added to the United States. In
1846 Great Britain at last yielded to the United States that part of
Oregon lying between the forty-second and forty-ninth parallels
of north latitude. By the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed
February 2, 1848, Mexico ceded to the United States all that territory north of the Rio Grande and the Gila Rivers, comprising New
Mexico, a part of New Navarre in old Mexico and the great country known as Upper California. The Gadsden purchase of 1853
rectified the Mexican frontier and added 45,535 square miles to
New Mexico. Since then have occurred in 1867 the cessions of
all Russian America, together with the Russian islands, stretching
across the Pacific; in 1897 the cession of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands, in 1898 the cession of the Spanish islands in the
Pacific, and the cessions of Puerto Rico, the Isle of Pines in the
Atlantic, and in 1903 a portion of the Isthmus of Panama, known
as the "Canal Zone." For all these cessions the United States has
given value. Minor cessions such as the District of Columbia, it is
unnecessary now to particularize.
To much of this great territory so ceded by the various powers
the American system of government has been extended, while over
much of the residue territorial governments have been established.
There is no solid reason why at no distant day all the possessions
annexed or ceded to the United States should not be provisionally
incorporated as States, territories or self-governing communities in
the great federal state, the citizens of each of such possessions obtaining substantially the same legal rights and enjoying the same
political guaranties as the people of the original states. This is a
consummation devoutly to be desired. It is the only solution consistent with the past history of the United States. That the domain thus acquired will never be voluntarily surrendered I believe.
No great statesman has ever yet dared to advocate the surrender
of a substantial portion of the national domain. If anyone in authority has so dared he has been execrated by posterity. When
the material resources of a great power begin to diminish the night
of that nation is at hand. Statesmanship is a practical science and
not a political theory. Statesmen do not surrender what they
take and hold in trust for the nation in perpetuity. Statesmen
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look forward to the needs of future generations. They have
regard to things latent in the womb of time. It is the politicians
who govern only for the day. The population of America, in one
or more centuries, will be five hundred millions. This will be
the great power of the Pacific Ocean. What will our posterity
then think, if the islands of the Pacific, now in our hands, have
been abandoned to rival powers, or then rest in unfriendly commercial hands?
But to return to the thread of our discourse. It must, I think,
be obvious that the distinctive and leading characteristics of the
public law of the United States are three: (1) the autonomy of
the separate States composing the United States; (2) the comprehensive and perfect sovereignty of the great Federal State in its
own sphere of action; and (3) the permanent judicial mode for
the arbitration of all disputes and controversies arising between
the States of the Union or any of them, or between the great
Federal State and any of such States, if the Federal State so elect.
If there is anything whatever, then, in the public law of the United
States which can be differentiated from the public law of other
continents-and this is the theme prescribed for me at this. timeit is disclosed in the three characteristics to which I have just
referred.
It would seem not irrelevant to this discussion to inquire what
the public law of the United States is theoretically worth, if anything, to the world at large. Would it not seem to be this-that
in any union or aggrandizement of states the local autonomy of
the combined states must be scrupulously respected, in so far
as is consistent with any union at all? This is the leading principle which the Federal Government of this country is always
obligated to apply when any voluntary augmentation of territory
is contemplated or effected. But perhaps, after all, the supreme
lesson taught by the Constitution of the Federal Government of
the United States is the importance it attached to arbitration.
Differences between allies or among the States of a Federal Union,
or between the Federal Government and the governments of the
states are inevitable, and such differences can be peacefully solved
only by a permanent court of arbitration.
The abolition of warfare has long been the dream of
humanitarians and of some philosophers. One of the finest minds
in all the ages (I refer to the philosopher Kant) has in substance
affirmed that if ever war shall be banished from the earth it
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will be due to some closer union of the great nations of the world.
It is due to Kant to state that in his Philosophy of Law he seems
to apprehend that such a union is impracticable. While conceding
that the art of government and the law of nations are two things
which never subject themselves to idealism, it would perhaps be
going too far to conclude that Kant's conception-that war can
be banished from the earth only by some closer union of stateswas an error. Doubtless if such a union of states ever shall
come to a realization, the federative plan presented in the Union
of American States will be sure to have received the profound
consideration of the nations concerned. Certainly should there
ever be one Federal state in all North America, another in South
America, like unions would follow throughout the world. Then
the pax humana will be nearer at hand than it is at present.
Without some such unions international arbitration must continue
to be the solution of only minor issues between nations rather
than the substitute for war.
It is very notable that some steps in the direction of the world
federation indicated have already been taken in America. In the
year 1890 the International American Conference held at Washington adopted a very significant resolution. In view of its
importance I will give it. It is as follows:
"Whereas there is in America no territory which can
be deemed res nullius; and
Whereas in view of this, a war of conquest of one
American nation against another would constitute a clearly
uijustifiable act of violence and spoliation; and
Whereas the possibility of aggressions upon national
territory would inevitably involve a recourse to the ruinous
system of war armaments in time of peace; and
Whereas the Conference feels that it would fall short
of the most exalted conception of its mission were it to
abstain from embodying its pacific and fraternal sentiments
in declarations tending to promote national stability and
guaranty just international relations among the nations of
the continent; be it therefore
Resolved, by the International American Conference,
that it earnestly recommends to the Governments therein
represented the adoption of the following declarations:
First. That the principle of conquest shall not, during
the continuance of the treaty of arbitration, be recognized
as admissible under American public law.
Second. That all cessions of territory made during the
continuance of the treaty of arbitration shall be void if
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made under threats of war or in the presence of an armed
force.
Third. Any nation from which such cessions shall be
exacted may demand that the validity of the cessions so
made shall be submitted to arbitration.
Fourth. Any renunciation of the right to arbitration,
made under the conditions named in the second section,
shall be null and void."
It is evident that this remarkable resolution only paraphrases
a principle of the international law of the United States, a principle which has had the careful consideration of this government
for now a century, and which in part is emphasized in what is
known as the "Monroe Doctrine." By the larger definition of
public law, before announced, the law of nations is a part of the
public law of the United 13tates. Had it not been for the principle stated in the Monroe Doctrine as a part of American public law, the guardianship of the soil of a large part of the Americas would long since have passed from its present custodians.
The future of the new world would have been altogether different
and the liberty and the safety of all the inhabitants of the Americas
would have been in jeopardy every hour. That all America has
been left to work out its own destiny is due primarily to the
hegemony of the great federated state of the United States and
to its public law. The notable resolution of the International
American Conference in 1890, already recited at length, suggests
that a Federal tie or union may be arrived at through mutual
affection of states as well as by a solidarity of interests. Those
states which have friends and enemies in common are in a sure
way to an early federation of some kind. This federation may
be of the narrowest sort; the individual autonomy of the various
federated powers may be almost absolute, but nevertheless any
union is a federation in kind if the general agent be definitely
constituted within its own independent sphere of action.
But to bring about general international arbitration is the
labor of practical statesmen, not a task for the ingenuity of political theorists. The principle of international arbitration can never
be enforced by weak states. Even to protect its neutrality a
state must be powerful. In order that a state may have its proper
influence in the world of the present it needs to be a strong
and a great power. It must be capable not only of expressing
its will, but of enforcing that will should occasion arise. A
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state advocating international arbitration as a substitute for force,
if its counsels are to be listened to and heeded by other nations,
must not be in a position where it will derive more material benefit
from arbitration than from force. An unarmed nation, standing
only for arbitration, will receive but slight attention from the
great military powers of the modem world. In short, the principle of international arbitration will be successfully applied on this
globe only when the states advocating it are altruistic and have
relatively nothing to gain by arbitration, for then it will be evident to the world that such states are animated only by high
moral principle and not by self-interest. A rich, lethargic, commercial nation, necessarily regardful. of self-interest, is, when
wholly unarmed for qonflict, in no position whatever to pose as
the successful advocate of arbitration. It is in a like situation
to that of the stout and plethoric burgher of the middle ages
when confronted with the man in armor. While advocating the
desirability of peace, we should never forget that all the laws
and all the nations of the world are the result of war and of
force.
It has been said by one of the greatest and most philosophical
jurists of the modern world that "law is the formal expression
of the means whereby a people organizes itself in the struggle
for existence." Then this legist proceeds to say, and what he
says in his epitome of the History of Roman Institutions is
adcurate: "War is the father of all things. Under the stress
of the perils of war a people consolidates into an army, into a
state. So far from being the power that destroys societies, war
is the power that builds them up. Legal order has its ultimate
origin in military order, and in this sense the soldier is 'pater
patriae!" If we remember that .every government but one in
this hemisphere is the result of war we shall see the application.
But because all this has been so in the past is not conclusive that
wars must go on forever. It is not idle to speculate on a long
reign of peace for the world. It is not fatuous to hope for it.
But speculation on any great theme in order to be valuable must
always be tempered by practical considerations. Some of these
practical considerations I have endeavored to indicate, and only
to indicate in this paper on the theme chosen.
Let me say a word before closing on the advantage of the
principle of local autonomy in American public law. Local
autonomy, or what is called in American political terminology
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"states' rights," is, as many of us in this country believe, at all
times a necessary condition of freedom and wholesome self-government. A great unitary state is inconsistent with liberty. Vast
empires, however strong, are incapable of the nicest adjustments
of human needs. There is in government a geographical limit
to internal efficiency, just -as there is none to outward efficiency.
It may be retorted that the local units of government in the
United States, and indeed in all America, are not now in many
respects exemplary models of governmental efficiency. This to
some extent may be accurate. All educated Americans are aware
of defects in the application of the principles of their government. But to admit such conclusions as final at this time is
highly premature. This country and all the countries of its
American allies are yet in the making. Perhaps several hundred
years will elapse before the citizenship of this or of any other
American state will be so thoroughly developed, so highly educated
and organized in a civic sense as to make our governmental forces
work without friction and with the ultimate perfection designed.
That a federal system of government is not only ideally the
best, but the best in practical operation for great populations,
scattered over wide and contiguous areas, the development of the
United States thus far, I think, conclusively shows. But whether
this be so or not, our national government is generally admitted
to be the most interesting experiment in government which the
world has ever seen. Yet our national government is no longer
in the experimental stage. To be sure the history of government
is a very long one. But the history of the great federal state"
in America, though short in comparison, is not, in fact, brief.
It is only so when we come to compare it with the history of the
world. Of course, what Divine Providence has yet in store for
America no mortal can know. All we can now say is that in
so far as our history has developed, it has certainly disclosed the
abstract wisdom of the federal system of government now in
force in the United States of America.
In conclusion, let me add that Americans, those whose traditions
are purely American, who have no familiarity with political
institutions other than their own, and who have inherited from
past generations of Americans -the political creed that no other
governmental institutions are founded on better principles of right
and justice-those Americans, I say, firmly believe that the seeds
of freedom and equality before the law, planted so long ago with
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such care and foresight in this hemisphere, will in the fullness
of time produce here not only a perfect governmental administration, but also its natural fruits, the triumph of justice and the
very peifection of human liberty. When America has accomplished this, which we term her mission, then her counsel and
example will, let us hope, be able to assure the peace of the
world. The fact that the public law of America contains elements,
or norms, which look to the pacification of the world, perhaps
differentiates it at the present time from the public law of other
continents.
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